A groundbreaking history of what drove the Germans to fight -- and keep fighting -- for a lost cause in World War II In The German War, acclaimed historian Nicholas Stargardt draws on an extraordinary range of firsthand testimony -- personal diaries, court records, and military correspondence -- to explore how the German people experienced the Second World War. When war broke out in September 1939, it was deeply unpopular in Germany. Yet without the active participation and commitment of the German people, it could not have continued for almost six years. What, then, was the war the Germans thought they were fighting? How did the changing course of the conflict -- the victories of the Blitzkrieg, the first defeats in the east, the bombing of German cities -- alter their views and expectations? And when did Germans first realize they were fighting a genocidal war? Told from the perspective of those who lived through it -- soldiers, schoolteachers, and housewives; Nazis, Christians, and Jews -- this masterful historical narrative sheds fresh and disturbing light on the beliefs and fears of a people who embarked on and fought to the end a brutal war of conquest and genocide.
Examines fundamental problems in the German-Jewish dialogue which the First World War laid bare, and which cannot be subsumed under the familiar dichotomy of assimilation and antisemitism. A new idea of manhood grew out of the war, providing a stereotype that became firmly rooted as a German ideal in the next decades. Christian patterns of belief gained new vitality, and the war was infused with Christian meaning and vocabulary. In both these cases, the Jew was the outsider, and eventually (in the late Weimar period and in the Nazi period) became the enemy. Focuses on the development of the concepts of the ideal German male and the Christian martyr as they evolved in Christian (focusing here on the Protestant) thought of those who fought in the trenches, during that war and afterwards.
In this book Alfred Mierzejewski describes how the German economy collapsed under Allied bombing in the last year of World War II. He presents a broad-based, original study of German wartime industry and transportation, and of Allied air force planning and intelligence, including the first complete analysis in English of the German National Railway. The German industrial economy was extraordinarily dependent on the timely, adequate distribution of coal by railroad and inland waterway. The German National Railway in particular was the pivot of the finely balanced armaments production and distribution system created by Albert Speer. But Allied strategists did not immediately recognize this. Only in late 1944, when Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Sir Arthur Tedder built a new strategic consensus, was this vital coal/transport nexus severed. The result was the rapid paralysis of the Nazi war economy. Mierzejewski measures the economic consequences of the bombing by considering broad indices such as armaments and coal production, railway performance, and weapons deliveries to the armed forces. In addition, he shows how individual companies in each of Germany's major economic regions fared. By drawing on previously unexamined files of private German manufacturing companies, the Reich Transportation Ministry, and Allied air intelligence agencies, Mierzejewski creates a rare combination of economic analysis and military history that provides new perspectives on the German war economy and Allied air intelligence.
This invaluable resource offers students a comprehensive overview of the German war machine that overran much of Europe during World War II, with close to 300 entries on a variety of topics and several key primary source documents. This book provides everything the reader needs to know about the German war machine that developed into the potent armed force under Adolf Hitler. This expansive encyclopedia covers the period of the German Third Reich, from January 1933 to the end of World War II in Europe, in May 1945. Dozens of entries on key battles and military campaigns, military and political leaders, military and intelligence organizations, and social and political topics that shaped German military conduct during World War II are followed by an illuminating epilogue that outlines why Germany lost World War II. A documents section includes more than a dozen fascinating primary sources on such significant events as the Tripartite Pact among Germany, Italy, and Japan; the Battle of Stalingrad; the Normandy Invasion; the Ardennes Offensive; and Germany's surrender. In addition, six appendices provide detailed information on a variety of topics such as German aces, military commanders, and military medals and decorations. The book ends with a chronology and a bibliography of print resources. Presents a comprehensive overview of how the German Army was able to rebuild itself from the ground up following World War I Explains how flawed German strategy blundered the country into a two- and even three-front war it could not hope to win Explores the contradiction of Wehrmacht complicity in the rise of the Nazis and the Holocaust, and the fact that a group of Wehrmacht officers formed Germany's only viable internal opposition to Hitler Examines many of the less popularly known but key German military leaders such as Ludwig Beck, Adolf Heusinger, Hans Speidel, Johannes Steinhoff, and Siegfried Westphal
This article, stating the British case, was issued as a recruiting pamphlet in Great Britain, but was used abroad as a simple explanation which would enable neutrals to understand the true facts. It was published in full by fifty leading journals in the United States, and was translated into Dutch and Danish, 25,000 copies being distributed in each country.
The Real German War Plan, 1904-14 fundamentally changes our understanding of German military planning before the First World War. On the basis of newly discovered or long-neglected documents in German military archives, this book gives the first description of Schlieffen's war plans in 1904 and 1905 and Moltke's plans from 1906 to 1914. It explodes unfounded myths concerning German war planning, gives the first appraisal of the actual military and political factors that influenced it, shows that there never was a 'Schlieffen Plan' and reveals Moltke's strategy for a war against Russia from 1909 to 1912. Tracing the decline in the German military position and the recognition by 1913 that Germany would be forced to fight outnumbered on both the eastern and western fronts, it is an essential read for anyone with an interest in the First World War.
Prussia (Kingdom). Armee. Grosser Generalstab. Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung II.