The Economics of Contracts, Second Edition

A Primer, 2nd Edition

Author: Bernard Salanie

Publisher:

ISBN:

Category: Contracts

Page: 256

View: 710

A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: "The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer."--Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France "Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner."--Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University

The Economics of Contracts

Theories and Applications

Author: Eric Brousseau

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

ISBN:

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 584

View: 223

A 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.

Readings in the Economics of Contract Law

Author: Victor P. Goldberg

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

ISBN:

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 252

View: 730

This collection brings together some of the main contributions to an important area of this work, the economics of contract law.

The Economics of Contract Law

Author: David W. Barnes

Publisher: West Academic Publishing

ISBN:

Category: Law

Page: 127

View: 551

Designed to integrate economic principles into a traditional contracts course. The cases and materials consider reasons why some contracts should not be enforced, where enforcement might lead to inefficient results due to externalities, mistake, or lack of capacity or consideration. Introduces the theory of efficient breach and applying that theory to issues of impracticability and impossibility. Considers various permutations of the traditional remedies for breach and the limitations on recovery of damages. The final section considers duress and unconscionability and offers economic rationales for not enforcing agreements into which parties have voluntarily entered.

Economics of Contract Law

Author: Douglas G. Baird

Publisher: Edward Elgar Pub

ISBN:

Category: Law

Page: 656

View: 816

This important volume presents a rich collection of ideas on and insights into the law and economics of contracts. It includes material relevant to a large number of legal fields.Many of the articles are classics that have, over the years, become focal points for continuing debate; others provide an easily accessible account of particular areas. The editor¿s comprehensive introduction provides an overview of law and economics scholarship in contracts over the past few decades and a portal into an evolving field. Topics include: the economics of contracting; efficient breach and renegotiation; expectation damages and its alternatives; default rules and mass markets.

An Introduction to the Economics of Information

Incentives and Contracts

Author: Inés Macho-Stadler

Publisher: Oxford University Press on Demand

ISBN:

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 287

View: 616

In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book is written for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business. After an introduction to the subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling. The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theory before moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extended exercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems.

The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics

Author: Philippe Aghion

Publisher: Oxford University Press

ISBN:

Category: Law

Page: 224

View: 193

The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession.

The Economics of Contract Choice

An Agrarian Perspective

Author: Yujiro Hayami

Publisher: Oxford University Press

ISBN:

Category: Technology & Engineering

Page: 209

View: 548

This work examines the nature of agrarian contracts. Agricultural land tenancy and farm labor are basic institutions binding the life and work of billions of people in the Third World. Issues of efficiency and equity associated with a particular form of contract--such as sharecropping--are not merely of academic interest, but have critical bearing on land tenure reform as well as innovations in credit and marketing institutions in agrarian economies. There have been major controversies surrounding the role of land tenure in agricultural and rural development, with much confusion arising from only partial and separate treatments of land and labor contracts. Through a comprehensive critical survey of existing literature, Hayami and Otsuka present a general theory of agrarian contracts by integrating land and labor contracts. Insights from the scrutiny of agrarian contracts are of relevance to industrial organization and management in developed economies as well as to the study of these fields.

The Economics of Contracts

Author: Patrick Bolton

Publisher: Edward Elgar Pub

ISBN:

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 992

View: 720

The Economics of Contracts provides a guided tour to the leading ideas in contract theory. It assembles some of the foundational writings on contracting under limited and asymmetric information, incentives and mechanism design. It contains, in particular, the key contributions of five recent Nobel Prize winners in economics and brings together the most important articles that have followed these path-breaking works.

The Economics of Contracts

Theories and Applications

Author: Eric Brousseau

Publisher:

ISBN:

Category: Contracts

Page: 584

View: 997

A comprehensive and up-to-date synthesis of the economic analysis of contracts, written by leading international scholars. The book offers a unique combination of theoretical and applied economics along with insights from law and management sciences, appealing to scholars, graduate students and practitioners in economics, management and law.

The Economics of Contracts

Theory and Applications

Author: Eric Brousseau

Publisher:

ISBN:

Category: Comparative law

Page: 584

View: 537

A comprehensive and up-to-date synthesis of the economic analysis of contracts, written by leading international scholars. The book offers a unique combination of theoretical and applied economics along with insights from law and management sciences, appealing to scholars, graduate students and practitioners in economics, management and law.

The economics of contracts. 1 (2008)

Author: Patrick Bolton

Publisher:

ISBN:

Category: Contracts

Page: 468

View: 148

"The Economics of Contracts provides a guided tour to the leading ideas in contract theory. It assembles some of the foundational writings on contracting under limited and asymmetric information, incentives and mechanism design. It contains, in particular, the key contributions of five recent Nobel Prize winners in economics and brings together the most important articles that have followed these path-breaking works."--Publisher's website.

Contract Theory

Author: Researcher Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Patrick Bolton

Publisher: MIT Press

ISBN:

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 724

View: 417

Provides an exhaustive account ot the field, using only very simple and self-contained models and relying on a whole battery of economic applications.

Firms, Markets, and Contracts

Contributions to Neoinstitutional Economics

Author: Ekkehart Schlicht

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN:

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 299

View: 902

Modern institutional economics witnesses a merging of formal and informal strands of theorizing. This development has offered new and vigorous perspectives which avoid both arbitrariness and theoretical sterility. The essays on contract theory gathered here exemplify this development. They propone new results on central issues in contractual theorizing. The theory of the firm in its variegated aspects forms, naturally, the core of the present set of contributions. Issues of ownership, integration, delegation, and finan ce are analyzed. Some contributions use the theoretical approach of contract theory to explore other issues, like medical care, public good problems, the economics of crime, environmental economics, and international trade. The contributors are leading young economists. They have participated in one or se veral classes of the 'International Summer School on the New Institutional Economics' which has been organized by Rudolf Richter in the years 1988 through 1994 and is now continued by Urs Schweizer. The theoretical style of these contributions has been influ enced by this experience. This collection of essays is intended to express the thanks of the contributors to Rudolf Richter. His initiatives for scholarly instruction and for inter national exchange of ideas have helped to create and to diffuse the understanding of and the engagement for the new institutional economics in Europe.

The Economics of Taxation

Author: Bernard Salanié

Publisher: MIT Press

ISBN:

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 237

View: 980

This second edition has been significantly revised and updated. Changes include a substantially rewritten chapter on direct taxation; a discussion of recent research in the chapter on mixed taxation; the replacement of the chapter on capital taxation with a chapter on the "new dynamic public finance"; and considerations of environmental taxation in both theory and policy chapters.

Contract Law and Economics

Author: Gerrit de Geest

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN:

Category: Law

Page: 496

View: 576

This unique and timely book offers an up-to-date, clear and comprehensive review of the economic literature on contract law. The topical chapters written by leading international scholars include: precontractual liability, misrepresentation, duress, gratuitous promises, gifts, standard form contracts, interpretation, contract remedies, penalty clauses, impracticability and foreseeability. Option contracts, warranties, long-term contracts, marriage contracts, franchise contracts, quasi-contracts, behavioral approaches, and civil contract law are also discussed. This excellent resource on contract law and economics will be particularly suited to contract law scholars, law teachers, policy makers, and judges. For experts in and practitioners of contract law this will be a key book to buy.

An Introduction to the Economics of Information

Incentives and Contracts

Author: Inés Macho-Stadler

Publisher: Oxford University Press

ISBN:

Category: Business & Economics

Page:

View: 523

In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book is written for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business. After an introduction to the subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling. The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theory before moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extended exercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems.