When the U.S. military began its "surge" in Iraq in 2006, counterinsurgency effectively became its dominant approach for fighting wars. Yet many of the major controversies and debates surrounding counterinsurgency operations have turned not on military questions but on legal ones: Who can the U.S. military attack with drones? Is the occupation of Iraq legitimate? What tradeoffs should the military make between self-protection and civilian casualties? What is the right framework for negotiating with the Taliban? How can we build the rule of law in Afghanistan? The Counterinsurgent's Constitution tackles this wide range of legal issues from the vantage point of counterinsurgency strategy. It explains why law matters in counterinsurgency, how law operates during counterinsurgency, and how law and counterinsurgency strategy can be better integrated. As Ganesh Sitaraman shows, far from being opposed, law and strategy are aligned and reinforcing. Following the laws of war is not just the right thing to do, it is strategically beneficial. Reconciliation with enemies can both end the conflict and preserve the possibility of justice for war crimes. Building the rule of law is not simply altruistic "nation-building," but an important strategy for success. The first book on law and counterinsurgency strategy, The Counterinsurgent's Constitution seamlessly integrates law and military strategy to illuminate some of the most pressing issues in warfare and the transition from war to peace.
In this original, provocative contribution to the debate over economic inequality, Ganesh Sitaraman argues that a strong and sizable middle class is a prerequisite for America’s constitutional system. A New York Times Notable Book of 2017 For most of Western history, Sitaraman argues, constitutional thinkers assumed economic inequality was inevitable and inescapable—and they designed governments to prevent class divisions from spilling over into class warfare. The American Constitution is different. Compared to Europe and the ancient world, America was a society of almost unprecedented economic equality, and the founding generation saw this equality as essential for the preservation of America’s republic. Over the next two centuries, generations of Americans fought to sustain the economic preconditions for our constitutional system. But today, with economic and political inequality on the rise, Sitaraman says Americans face a choice: Will we accept rising economic inequality and risk oligarchy or will we rebuild the middle class and reclaim our republic? The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution is a tour de force of history, philosophy, law, and politics. It makes a compelling case that inequality is more than just a moral or economic problem; it threatens the very core of our constitutional system.
International Law and United States Counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan
Author: Travers McLeod
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Category: Political Science
Rule of Law in War places international law at the centre of the transformation of United States counterinsurgency (COIN) that occurred during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It claims international law matters more than is often assumed and more than we have previously been able to claim, contradicting existing theoretical assumptions. In particular, the book contends international law matters in a case that may be regarded as particularly tough for international law, that is, the development of a key military doctrine, the execution of that doctrine on the battlefield, and the ultimate conduct of armed conflict. To do so, the book traces international law's influence in the construction of modern U.S. COIN doctrine, specifically, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, released by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps in December 2006. It then assesses how international law's doctrinal interaction held up in Iraq and Afghanistan. The account of this doctrinal change is based on extensive access to the primary actors and materials, including FM 3-24's drafting history, field documents, and interviews with military officers of various ranks who have served multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.
On the surface, "wartime" is a period of time in which a society is at war. But we now live in what President Obama has called "an age without surrender ceremonies," where it is no longer easy to distinguish between times of war and times of peace. In this inventive meditation on war, time, and the law, Mary Dudziak argues that wartime is not as discrete a time period as we like to think. Instead, America has been engaged in some form of ongoing overseas armed conflict for over a century. Meanwhile policy makers and the American public continue to view wars as exceptional events that eventually give way to normal peace times. This has two consequences: first, because war is thought to be exceptional, "wartime" remains a shorthand argument justifying extreme actions like torture and detention without trial; and second, ongoing warfare is enabled by the inattention of the American people. More disconnected than ever from the wars their nation is fighting, public disengagement leaves us without political restraints on the exercise of American war powers.
Colonel Robin Evelegh retired from the British Army in 1977, having commanded his infantry battalion on separate tours at the Springfield Road police station in Belfast in 1972 and 1973. it struck him forcibly at the time that the Government's overall campaign to restore a peacetime level of order in Northern Ireland seemed doomed to failure, although most of the conditions that could be thought necessary for success- skilled and sensitive politicians, devoted civil servants and a disciplined army and police force- were present. This failure, it became clear, arose from faults in the constitutional framework for controlling the campaign against insurrection, and from shortcomings in the laws which laid down the operational rules for the Security forces to suppress terrorism and disorder. The constitutional faults meant that the government's campaign could not be managed effectively, and the shortcomings in the laws meant that a heavy political price had to be paid for draconian legal powers that were almost irrelevant, while the security forces were crippled by the lack of quite minor laws which would have made them effective, and which carried only a modest political penalty. The reasons for these uncertainties and inadequacies are complex. Colonel Evelegh analyses them ruthlessly, and makes their consequences clear - powerfully illustrating his thesis from personal experience in Northern Ireland, from the past, and from counter-insurgency campaigns of recent times. His remedies are argued in detail.