Our conception of logical space is the set of distinctions we use to navigate the world. In The Construction of Logical Space Agustín Rayo defends the idea that one's conception of logical space is shaped by one's acceptance or rejection of 'just is'-statements: statements like 'to be composed of water just is to be composed of H2O', or 'for the number of the dinosaurs to be zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs'. The resulting picture is used to articulate a conception of metaphysical possibility that does not depend on a reduction of the modal to the non-modal, and to develop a trivialist philosophy of mathematics, according to which the truths of pure mathematics have trivial truth-conditions.
For all their strides in understanding how we create and think about cultures, psychologists, linguists, and logicians have had difficulty explaining how we conceive our selves?how the self can, in fact, be both the object and the subjective originator of its surroundings. Harwood Fisher's purpose in this far-reaching, interdisciplinary book is to depict the subjective self in its true complex duality. In The Subjective Self, Fisher argues that the key to depicting both aspects of the self simultaneously and thus modeling it more holistically than before is to visualize the self in a logical space. From an origin point inside this space, the self tries out metaphors and launches categories to logically order what it wants, sees, and encounters. This is a creative cognitive process, "metaphoric framing," by which the self invents new forms and depicts new organizations of its experiences, impressions, and information. It is also a generative linguistic process, "bracketing," by which the self can step outside its own expressed thoughts, gain new levels of awareness, re-position itself as an agent responsible for its ideas and statements, and, in short, empower its own identity. The framing sets in motion versatile mental categories?forms that are projected into mental space, where they become objectified. The bracketing sets in motion the logical bounds of the "I," stabilizing the individual's identity and giving thrust to the subjective self's dynamic causal role. In elaborating this theory, Fisher extends the ideas of Kurt Lewin, Jean Piaget, and C. S. Peirce, among others. By drawing on each of these thinkers, he is able to bring their common themes of perspective and construction together in his portrait of the self as a creative iconic space.
Available for the first time in 20 years, here are two important works from the 1920s by the best-known representative of the Vienna Circle. In The Logical Structure of the World, Carnap adopts the position of "methodological solipsism" and shows that it is possible to describe the world from the immediate data of experience. In his Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, he asserts that many philosophical problems are meaningless.
This volume introduces equivariant homotopy, homology, and cohomology theory, along with various related topics in modern algebraic topology. It explains the main ideas behind some of the most striking recent advances in the subject. The book begins with a development of the equivariant algebraic topology of spaces culminating in a discussion of the Sullivan conjecture that emphasizes its relationship with classical Smith theory. It then introduces equivariant stable homotopy theory, the equivariant stable homotopy category, and the most important examples of equivariant cohomology theories. The basic machinery that is needed to make serious use of equivariant stable homotopy theory is presented next, along with discussions of the Segal conjecture and generalized Tate cohomology.Finally, the book gives an introduction to 'brave new algebra', the study of point-set level algebraic structures on spectra and its equivariant applications. Emphasis is placed on equivariant complex cobordism, and related results on that topic are presented in detail. It introduces many of the fundamental ideas and concepts of modern algebraic topology. It presents comprehensive material not found in any other book on the subject. It provides a coherent overview of many areas of current interest in algebraic topology. It surveys a great deal of material, explaining main ideas without getting bogged down in details.
happens, how it happens, and why it happens. Our assumption ought to be that this is as true in education as it is in atomic physics. But this leaves many other questions to answer. The crucial ones: What kind of science is proper or appropriate to education? How does it differ from physics? What is wrong with the prevai1~ ing, virtually unopposed research tradition in education? What could or should be done to replace it with a more adequate tradi tion? What concepts are necessary to describe and explain what we find there? It is in this realm that we find ourselves. Where to start? One place - our place, needless to say - is with one limited but central concept in education, teaching. A long philosophical tradition concerned with the nature of teaching goes back (along with everything else) to Plato, divulging most recent ly in the work of such philosophers as B. O. Smith, Scheffler, Hirst, Komisar, Green, McClellan, Soltis, Kerr, Fenstermacher, et al. An empirical tradition runs parallelto the philosophers -it has its most notable modern proponents in Gage, the Soars, Berliner, Rosen shine, but its roots can be traced to the Sophists. These two tradi tions have been at loggerheads over the centuries.
The general view of Russell's work amongst philosophers has been that repeat edly, during his long and distinguished career, crucial changes of mind on fun damental points were significant enough to cause him to successively adopt a diversity of radically new philosophical positions. Thus Russell is seen to have embraced and then abandoned, amongst others, neo-Hegelianism, Platonic re alism, phenomenalism and logical atomism, before settling finally on a form of neutral monism that philosophers have generally found to be incredible. This view of Russell is captured in C. D. Broad's famous remark that "Mr. Russell pro duces a different system of philosophy every few years . . . " (Muirhead, 1924: 79). Reflecting this picture of Russell continually changing his position, books and papers on Russell's philosophy have typically belonged to one of two kinds. Either they have concentrated on particular periods of his thought that are taken to be especially significant, or, accepting the view of his successive conversion to dis tinctly different philosophical positions, they have provided some account of each of these supposedly disconnected periods of his thought. While much good work has been done on Russell's philosophy, this framework has had its limitations, the main one being that it conceals the basic continuity behind his thought.