Personnel, Equipment, and Cost Issues Related to the European Drawdown : Briefing Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
While traditionally, Americans view expensive military structure as a poor investment and a threat to liberty, they also require a guarantee of that very freedom, necessitating the employment of armed forces. Beginning with the seventeenth-century wars of the English colonies, Americans typically increased their military capabilities at the beginning of conflicts only to decrease them at the apparent conclusion of hostilities. In Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar, a stellar team of military historians argue that the United States sometimes managed effective drawdowns, sowing the seeds of future victory that Americans eventually reaped. Yet at other times, the drawing down of military capabilities undermined our readiness and flexibility, leading to more costly wars and perhaps defeat. The political choice to reduce military capabilities is influenced by Anglo-American pecuniary decisions and traditional fears of government oppression, and it has been haphazard at best throughout American history. These two factors form the basic American “liberty dilemma,” the vexed relationship between the nation and its military apparatuses from the founding of the first colonies through to present times. With the termination of large-scale operations in Iraq and the winnowing of forces in Afghanistan, the United States military once again faces a significant drawdown in standing force structure and capabilities. The political and military debate currently raging around how best to affect this force reduction continues to lack a proper historical perspective. This volume aspires to inform this dialogue. Not a traditional military history, Drawdown analyzes cultural attitudes, political decisions, and institutions surrounding the maintenance of armed forces.
United States. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. EUROPEAN OFFICE.
Challenges to Readiness : Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Readiness of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, Hearing Held April 7, 2011
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Readiness
Department of Defense (DoD) policies have historically supported specific objectives with regard to minorities in all phases of the manpower system, including accession, retention, and promotion. Drawdown policies, however, have been designed primarily to meet endstrength goals, without regard to any potential effects on specific groups. The purpose of this research is to analyze the effects of the drawdown on the promotion of minority officers. The research utilizes data covering all services provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. Ordinary least squares and logit modeling techniques are employed to estimate the promotion performance of officers prior to, and during, the drawdown. The results show that, across DoD, minority status is no longer a factor in promotion outcomes; and the promotion of minority officers, in general, has not been adversely affected during the drawdown. However, there has been a significant decline in the probability of promotion for blacks and Hispanics in the Navy. Further research is recommended to refine the promotion models and monitor minority group promotion opportunities as the drawdown continues.
Air Force units have found differences between authorized and actual numbers of personnel, partly because of deployments. Using historical and other data and interviews, the authors assessed the wing-level effects of these disparities including skill levels and personnel tempo. The recommendations include improvements in manpower bookkeeping and requirement determination, use of dynamic simulation models, and implementation of suitable metrics.
As the drawdown in defense spending starts to take effect, the Department of Defense's ability to maintain the readiness of its military forces is the subject of growing debate. Both civil and military leaders express deep-seated concerns about the impact on national security of defense cuts imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the March 1, 2013 sequestration. In the past, policy makers have tended to over correct with military drawdowns, thereby paving the way for military missteps. United States policies and defense strategies have historically left the military unprepared for the next conflict following drawdowns. The trajectory of defense spending since 9/11 is fiscally unsustainable despite an ever changing environment that is less secure, as a major drawdown of defense force structure is on the horizon. President Barack Obama warned that "we can't afford to repeat the mistakes that have been made in the past - after World War II, after Vietnam - when our military was left ill-prepared for the future." The question remains is how to accomplish this drawdown without hollowing the force. The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate through case study analysis relevant historical insights from past post-war military drawdowns that should be applied to current budget decisions in order not to end up with a “hollow force” incapable of executing the National Security Strategy. The author concludes that historical lessons from past post-war drawdowns provide a framework for planning the U.S. force structure of the 21st Century.
Planning Future U.S. Fighter Forces offers a general discussion on force structure and planning options the air force will most likely face over the next few years. It addresses the growing controversy over how to modernize U.S. fighter forces in the post-Cold War era--a controversy that is intensified by the critical role that airpower plays in defense strategy and its high cost. The author's purpose is to explore the many factors that will have to be evaluated in order to develop sound policy for modernization. Although new models for defense planning are needed, the writer warns against hasty and abrupt changes that may limit flexibility and choices for U.S. fighter forces in the short term.
The end of the Cold War created a golden opportunity for reducing the defense burden and providing taxpayers with a "Peace Dividend." For the United States Air Force, this resulted over the past six years in drastic reductions: 23% in aircraft inventory, 30% in personnel, and 32% in the number of bases and other major installations. Well-known and long-serving aircraft, such as the A-7D/K, the B-52G, the F-4C/D/E, the F-111A/D, the FB-111A and the SR-71, have been withdrawn from active and reserve components, and some states, such as California, have lost nearly half of their Air Force bases. Illustrated with over 410 color photos, this new book provides a rich pictorial record of aircraft (including old and new markings) and units which no longer exist, and offers a visual chronicle of organizational changes between 1988-1995.
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Defense
This report analyzes prime and subprime Defense Department contract data to measure the impacts of the drawdown by sector to better understand how prime and subprime contractors have responded to this external market shock.
While many elements of combat power have increased in and around Iraq over the past year -- including sea, air, and space power -- both public officials and members of the media have described the increase in military force almost exclusively in terms of major ground units. The most common description of the surge highlights the increase in brigade combat teams (BCT) from 15 to 20. The current debate over Iraq strategy centers on the questions of when, and how rapidly, forces will be reduced in Iraq, and it continues to revolve around major ground units. It seems likely that this trend will continue. Discussions of when and how the U.S. Army BCTs will leave Iraq will dominate the discourse about the coalition's future in Iraq. For all of the discussion about force levels and combat units in Iraq, it is surprising that one important aspect of the coming drawdown has not been discussed widely -- until now. While major ground units will soon begin leaving without replacement, air units in the region cannot do so. Air forces must stay behind to protect and support the coalition forces that remain, particularly the Army's dispersed transition teams -- the key link to successful training for Iraqi forces. These teams typically consist of 11-15 members, each of whom brings key specialties to the team. Transition teams embed within their assigned Iraqi unit, and their role is to advise, coach, and mentor these units. Air forces must also control and protect the sovereign airspace over Iraq, as the Iraqi air force is many years away from being able to do this. Over time, this will manifest itself in a drawdown asymmetry that will have weighty implications for coalition policy in Iraq as well as for the long-term health of the organizations tasked to provide these air forces, chiefly the U.S. Air Force. Ultimately, the consequences may manifest themselves in such a way that the term "drawdown asymmetry" will become a key element of the language used to discuss Iraq strategy.