This book is both an examination of, and a contribution to, our understanding of the theoretical foundations of the common law of contract. Focusing on contemporary debates in contract theory, Contract Theory aims to help readers better understand the nature and justification of the general idea of contractual obligation, as well as the nature and justification of the particular rules that make up the law of contract. The book is in three parts. Part I introduces the idea of 'contract theory', and presents a framework for identifying, classifying, and evaluating contract theories. Part II describes and evaluates the most important general theories of contract; examples include promissory theories, reliance-based theories, and economic theories. In Part III, the theoretical issues raised by the various specific doctrines that make up the law of contract (e.g., offer and acceptance, consideration, mistake, remedies, etc.) are examined in separate chapters. The legal focus of the book is the common law of the United Kingdom, but the theoretical literature discussed is international in origin; the arguments discussed are thus relevant to understanding the law of other common law jurisdictions and, in many instances, to understanding the law of civil law jurisdictions as well.
These essays carefully show that classic social-contract theory was an ancien regime genre. Far more than is commonly realized, the local horizon was built into Hobbes s and Locke s theories and the genre drew on the absolutism of Bodin and Grotius.
In recent years there has been a significant increase of interest in continuous-time Principal-Agent models, or contract theory, and their applications. Continuous-time models provide a powerful and elegant framework for solving stochastic optimization problems of finding the optimal contracts between two parties, under various assumptions on the information they have access to, and the effect they have on the underlying "profit/loss" values. This monograph surveys recent results of the theory in a systematic way, using the approach of the so-called Stochastic Maximum Principle, in models driven by Brownian Motion. Optimal contracts are characterized via a system of Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations. In a number of interesting special cases these can be solved explicitly, enabling derivation of many qualitative economic conclusions.
This book presents theoretical research between wireless communications, networking, and economics using the framework of contract theory. This work fills a void in the literature by closely combining contract theoretical approaches with wireless networks design problems. Topics covered include classification in contract theory, reward design, adverse selection, and moral hazard. The authors also explore incentive mechanisms for device-to-device communication in cellular networks, insurance plans for service assurance in cloud computing markets with incomplete information, multi-dimensional incentive mechanisms and tournament based incentive mechanisms in mobile crowdsourcing. Financial applications include financing contracts with adverse selection for spectrum trading in cognitive radio networks and complementary investment of infrastructure and service providers in wireless network visualization. This book offers a useful reference for engineers and researchers in the wireless communication community who seek to integrate the notions from contract theory and wireless engineering, while emphasizing on how contract theory can be applied in wireless networks. It is also suitable for advanced-level students studying information systems or communications engineering.
This interdisciplinary work draws on research from psychology and behavioral economics to evaluate the plausibility of moral contract theory. In a compelling manner with implications for moral theory more broadly, the author’s novel approach resolves a number of key contingencies in contractarianism and contractualism. Acting in accordance with principles that we could all agree to under certain conditions requires that agents are capable of taking up the perspectives of others. Research in social and developmental psychology shows just how challenging this can be. The author discusses in detail what implications findings on perspective-taking have for contract theory. He concludes with cautious optimism that, despite our limitations, it lies within our power to become better at perspective-taking and to adopt a contractarian or contractualist mode of moral thinking. This does however require us to be much more attentive to the standpoints of others than we tend to be. Contract theorists also assume that agents can be moved to comply with principles that would be the object of agreement, with some arguing they can be so moved out of their own interest. The book show that, in contrast to the suspicion of many philosophers, this idea is largely supported by research on the dynamics of trust and our ability to distinguish trustworthy from untrustworthy others. Bringing a welcome dose of realism to the debate on contract theory, the author shows the value of assessing moral theories from an empirical perspective.
Despite decades of attempts and the best intentions of its members, the United States Supreme Court has failed to develop a coherent jurisprudence regarding the state’s proper relationship to the individual. Without some objective standard upon which to ground jurisprudence, decisions have moved along a spectrum between freedom and authority and back again, affecting issues as diverse as individual contractual liberties and the right to privacy. Social Contract Theory in American Jurisprudence seeks to reintroduce the lessons of modern political philosophy to offer a solution for this variable application of legal principle and to lay the groundwork for a jurisprudence consistent in both theory and practice. Thomas R. Pope’s argument examines two exemplary court cases, Lochner v. New York and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, and demonstrates how the results of these cases failed to achieve the necessary balance of liberty and the public good because they considered the matter in terms of a dichotomy. Pope explores our constitution’s roots in social contract theory, looking particularly to the ideas of Thomas Hobbes for a jurisprudence that is consistent with the language and tradition of the Constitution, and that is also more effectually viable than existing alternatives. Pope concludes with an examination of recent cases before the Court, grounding his observations firmly within the developments of ongoing negotiation of jurisprudence. Addressing the current debate between individual liberty and government responsibility within the context of contemporary jurisprudence, Pope considers the implications of a Hobbesian founding for modern policy. This book will be particularly relevant to scholars of Constitutional Law, the American Founding, and Modern Political Theory.
Michael Moehler develops a novel multilevel social contract theory. In contrast to existing theories in the liberal tradition, it does not merely assume a restricted form of reasonable moral pluralism, but is tailored to the conditions of deeply morally pluralistic societies which may be populated by liberal moral agents, nonliberal moral agents, and, according to the traditional understanding of morality, nonmoral agents alike. Moehler draws on the history of the social contract tradition, especially the work of Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Rawls, and Gauthier, as well as on the work of some of the critics of this tradition, such as Sen and Gaus. Moehler's two-level contractarian theory holds that morality in its best contractarian version for the conditions of deeply morally pluralistic societies entails Humean, Hobbesian, and Kantian moral features. The theory defines the minimal behavioral restrictions that are necessary to ensure, compared to violent conflict resolution, mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in deeply morally pluralistic societies. The theory minimizes the problem of compliance in morally diverse societies by maximally respecting the interests of all members of society. Despite its ideal nature, the theory is, in principle, applicable to the real world and, for the conditions described, most promising for securing mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in a world in which a fully just society, due to moral diversity, is unattainable. If Rawls' intention was to carry the traditional social contract argument to a higher level of abstraction, then the two-level contractarian theory brings it back down to earth.
Essay from the year 2008 in the subject Politics - Political Theory and the History of Ideas Journal, grade: 80%= good, University of Kerala (Department of Political Science), course: Political Theory- Liberal Tradition, language: English, abstract: This essay compares the classical social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Different perceptions of the state of nature resulted in different ideas about the social contract and its emphasis on either security (Hobbes), individual rights (Locke) or the collective freedom of Rousseau's general will. Political philosophy is believed to have started with Plato's "Republic," the first known sophisticated analysis of a fundamental question that humans have probably been concerned with much longer: how should human society be organised, i.e. who should rule and why? Plato believed that ruling required special training and skills and should therefore be left to an aristocracy of guardians who had received extensive training. While the notion that ruling requires expertise can hardly be denied there is also agreement among most philosophers that whoever qualifies for the job of ruling needs to do so with the interest of the people in mind. But what is the interest of the people and how can it be discovered? According to Plato, a necessary precondition for rulers is wisdom and that is why he wanted his guardians to be especially trained in philosophy. One may think that the people themselves should know what is best for them but somewhat surprisingly this idea has been rejected not just by Plato but also by many philosophers following him. Another approach is to link rule on Earth to a mandate received from a divine Creator. However, even the idea that humans could not exist without a government has been questioned, most notably by anarchism. Thus, the question of how political rule, the power to make decisions for others, could be justified is an essential one. Only legitimate rule creates obligation and without o