This book examines the constitutional principles governing the relationship between legislatures and courts at that critical crossroads of their power where legislatures may seek to intervene in the judicial process, or to interfere with judicial functions, to secure outcomes consistent with their policy objectives or interests. Cases of high political moment are usually involved, where the temptation, indeed political imperative, for legislatures to intervene can be overwhelming. Although the methods of intervention are various, ranging from the direct and egregious to the subtle and imperceptible, unbridled legislative power in this regard has been a continuing concern in all common law jurisdictions. Prominent examples include direct legislative interference in pending cases, usurpation of judicial power by legislatures, limitations on the jurisdiction of courts, strategic amendments to law applicable to cases pending appeal, and attempts directly to overturn court decisions in particular cases. Because the doctrine of the separation of powers, as an entrenched constitutional rule, is a major source of principle, the book will examine in detail the jurisprudence of the United States and Australia in particular. These jurisdictions have identical constitutional provisions entrenching that doctrine as well as the most developed jurisprudence on this point. The legal position in the United Kingdom, which does not have an entrenched separation of powers doctrine, will be examined as a counterpoint. Other relevant jurisdictions (such as Canada, Ireland and India) are also examined in the context of particular principles, particularly when their respective jurisprudence is rather more developed on discrete points. The book examines how the relevant constitutional principles strive to maintain the primacy of the law-making role of the legislature in a representative democracy and yet afford the decisional independence of the judiciary that degree of protection essential to protect it from the legislature's 'impetuous vortex', to borrow the words of James Madison from The Federalist (No 48).
In this follow-up volume to the critically acclaimed The Constitutional State, N. W. Barber explores how the principles of constitutionalism structure and influence successful states. Constitutionalism is not exclusively a mechanism to limit state powers. An attractive and satisfying account of constitutionalism, and, by derivation, of the state, can only be reached if the principles of constitutionalism are seen as interlocking parts of a broader doctrine. This holistic study of the relationship between the constitutional state and its central principles - sovereignty; the separation of powers; the rule of law; subsidiarity; democracy; and civil society - casts light on long-standing debates over the meaning and implications of constitutionalism. The book provides a concise introduction to constitutionalism and a detailed account of the nature and implications of each of the principles in question. It concludes with an examination of the importance of constitutional principles to the work of judges, legislators, and others involved in the operation and creation of the constitution. The book is essential reading for those seeking a definitive account of constitutionalism and its benefits.
The idea of the separation of powers is still popular in much political and constitutional discourse, though its meaning for the modern state remains unclear and contested. This book develops a new, comprehensive, and systematic account of the principle. It then applies this new concept to legal problems of different national constitutional orders, the law of the European Union, and international institutional law. It connects an argument from normative political theory with phenomena taken from comparative constitutional law. The book argues that the conflict between individual liberty and democratic self-determination that is characteristic of modern constitutionalism is proceduralized through the establishment of different governmental branches. A close analysis of the relation between individual and collective autonomy on the one hand and the ways lawmaking through public institutions can be established on the other hand helps us identify criteria for determining how legislative, administrative, and judicial lawmaking can be distinguished and should be organized. These criteria define a common ground in the confusing variety of western constitutional traditions and their diverse use of the notion of separated powers. They also enable us to establish a normative framework that throws a fresh perspective on problems of constitutional law in different constitutional systems: constitutional judicial review of legislation, limits of legislative delegation, parliamentary control of the executive, and standing. Linking arguments from comparative constitutional law and international law, the book then uses this framework to offer a new perspective on the debate on constitutionalism beyond the state. The concept permits certain institutional insights of the constitutional experiences within states to be applied at the international level without falling into any form of methodological nationalism.
The new series Stellenbosch Handbooks in African Constitutional Law will engage with contemporary issues of constitutionalism in Africa, filling a notable gap in African comparative constitutional law. Separation of Powers in African Constitutionalism is the first in the series, examining one of the critical measures introduced by African constitutional designers in their attempts to entrench an ethos of constitutionalism on the continent. Taking a critical look at the different ways in which attempts have been made to separate the different branches of government, the Handbook examines the impact this is having on transparent and accountable governance. Beginning with an overview of constitutionalism in Africa and the different influences on modern African constitutional developments, it looks at the relationship between the legislature and the executive as well as the relationship between the judiciary and the political branches. Despite differences in approaches between the different constitutional cultures that have influenced developments in Africa, there remain common problems. One of these problems is the constant friction in the relationship between the three branches and the resurgent threats of authoritarianism which clearly suggest that there remain serious problems in both constitutional design and implementation. The book also studies the increasing role being played by independent constitutional institutions and how they complement the checks and balances associated with the traditional three branches of government.
Since the previous edition of this book, changes have taken place with Ireland's Articles of the Constitution, including challenges to the Articles, referenda, new legislation, and judicially-considered cases. This third edition is almost completely re-written as a result of the tumultuous changes in Irish constitutional law. Author Michael Ford - an accomplished constitutional law author and practitioner - offers the reader everything needed to know on this complex subject.
The first five editions of this well established book were written by Colin Turpin. This new edition has been prepared jointly by Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins. This edition sees a major restructuring of the material, as well as a complete updating. New developments such as the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and recent case law concerning the sovereignty of Parliament, the Human Rights Act, counter-terrorism and protests against the Iraq War, among other matters, are extracted and analysed. While it includes extensive material and commentary on contemporary constitutional reform, Turpin and Tomkins is a book that covers the historical traditions and the continuity of the British constitution as well as the current tide of change. All the chapters contain detailed suggestions for further reading. Designed principally for law students the book includes substantial extracts from parliamentary and other political sources, as well as from legislation and case law. As such it is essential reading also for politics and government students. Much of the material has been reworked and with its fresh design the book provides a detailed yet accessible account of the British constitution at a fascinating moment in its ongoing development.
In this book, Bogusia Puchalska develops an original theory of democratic constitutionalism and uses it to support the argument that constitution-making and lawmaking in constitutional moments should be politically, and not just constitutionally legitimate. This original and informative book should be read by all curious to understand how the democratic learning and the foundations of grass-root constitutionalism might have been damaged in post-communist countries.