America's Unwritten Constitution presents a bold new vision of the American constitutional system, one in which proper interpretation of the Constitution rests on the interplay between its written and unwritten manifestations, but in which interpretation does not, and cannot, depend wholly on one form or the other. Neither America's written Constitution nor its unwritten Constitution stands alone, Amar shows, and with each eye-opening example he develops a deeper, more compelling way of thinking about constitutional law than has ever been put forth before-a methodology that looks past the basic text to reveal the diverse influences, supplements, and possibilities that comprise it.
America is five hundred years old; the United States is less than half that age. The term America was coined in 1507 to refer to a continent and a dream of a new world. People in the United States, especially government leaders, have a serious problem of regularly speaking as if their country were America. Author Gabriel Moran reflects on the use of the word America in the United States from its beginning to the present. He cites numerous examples to show the importance of distinguishing between the United States and America. The result is a different way of perceiving and understanding the history of the United States. This book is especially relevant to the current political division within the United States and some of the missteps in its foreign policy. The failure to consistently distinguish between the nation of the United States and the continent and dream America underlies nearly every political, cultural and economic problem that the country faces.
This book explains a paradox in American constitutional law: how a right not discussed during the ratification debates at Philadelphia and not mentioned in the text has become a core component of modern freedom. Rather, privacy is a constitutional afterthought that has gained force through modern interpretations of an old text. Heffernan defends privacy rights against originalist objections to its inclusion in modern constitutional doctrine, analyzes the structure of privacy claims, and provides a blueprint for protecting privacy against government incursion. The book will appeal to a wide audience of students and researchers of criminal procedure, constitutional history, law-and-society, and sociology of law. Lawyers will find this book extremely valuable in addressing the statutory issues associated with modern privacy law. At last, a book about constitutional interpretation that speaks plain English and makes sense. It’s the best work I know on the subject, yet that subject is not the one it’s mostly about. The book mostly tells the story of the constitutional right to privacy and how it emerged from provisions that at the outset were not much about privacy at all. On that subject, the book is definitive. It’s also fascinating, probing, engaging, insightful, and wonderfully presented. Privacy and the American Constitution is a stellar contribution to knowledge. Albert W. Alschuler, Julius Kreeger of Law and Criminology, Emeritus, University of Chicago A powerful and innovate contribution to constitutional law. Not only does Heffernan offer us a fascinating and persuasive account of how modern constitutional rights grew out of the personal space offered to us in an earlier era, he also explains why privacy rights deserve the newfound importance they have in our modern jurisprudence, based upon the same Madisonian approach to constitutional interpretation that justifies other central parts of modern constitutional law. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Alan Joseph Bennett Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law
The Harvard Law Review is offered in a digital edition, featuring active Contents, linked notes, and proper ebook formatting. The contents of Issue 6 include scholarly articles and student case notes, as well as as the extensive annual Developments in the Law survey. This year's subject is immigration law and policy. Further articles include analysis of transaction costs under the Coase Theorem and the idea of an "unwritten Constitution."
University Professor of Law and Philosophy David Dyzenhaus
Author: University Professor of Law and Philosophy David Dyzenhaus
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Constitutional law has been and remains an area of intense philosophical interest, and yet the debate has taken place in a variety of different fields with very little to connect them. In a collection of essays bringing together scholars from several constitutional systems and disciplines, Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law unites the debate in a study of the philosophical issues at the very foundations of the idea of a constitution: why one might be necessary; what problems it must address; what problems constitutions usually address; and some of the issues raised by the administration of a constitutional regime. Although these issues of institutional design are of abiding importance, many of them have taken on new significance in the last few years as law-makers have been forced to return to first principles in order to justify novel practices and arrangements in their constitutional orders. Thus, questions of constitutional 'revolutions,' challenges to the demands of the rule of law, and the separation of powers have taken on new and pressing importance. The essays in this volume address these questions, filling the gap in the philosophical analysis of constitutional law. The volume will provoke specialists in philosophy, politics, and law to develop new philosophically grounded analyses of constitutional law, and will be a valuable resource for graduate students in law, politics and philosophy.
In recent years, the term 'transparency' has emerged as one of the most popular and keenly-touted concepts around. In the economic-political debate, the principle of transparency is often advocated as a prerequisite for accountability, legitimacy, policy efficiency, and good governance, as well as a universal remedy against corruption, corporate and political scandals, financial crises, and a host of other problems. But transparency is more than a mere catch-phrase. Increased transparency is a bearing ideal behind regulatory reform in many areas, including financial reporting and banking regulation. Individual governments as well as multilateral bodies have launched broad-based initiatives to enhance transparency in both economic and other policy domains. Parallel to these developments, the concept of transparency has seeped its way into academic research in a wide range of social science disciplines, including the economic sciences. This increased importance of transparency in economics and business studies has called for a reference work that surveys existing research on transparency and explores its meaning and significance in different areas. The Oxford Handbook of Economic and Institutional Transparency is such a reference. Comprised of authoritative yet accessible contributions by leading scholars, this Handbook addresses questions such as: What is transparency? What is the rationale for transparency? What are the determinants and the effects of transparency? And is transparency always beneficial, or can it also be detrimental (if so, when)? The chapters are presented in three sections that correspond to three broad themes. The first section addresses transparency in different areas of economic policy. The second section covers institutional transparency and explores the role of transparency in market integration and regulation. Finally, the third section focuses on corporate transparency. Taken together, this volume offers an up-to-date account of existing work on and approaches to transparency in economic research, discusses open questions, and provides guidance for future research, all from a blend of disciplinary perspectives.
This innovative book explores the nature and function of 'sunset clauses' and experimental legislation, or temporary legislation that expires after a determined period of time, allowing legislators to test out new rules and regulations within a set time frame and on a small-scale basis.
Originally the constitution was expected to express and channel popular sovereignty. It was the work of freedom, springing from and facilitating collective self-determination. After the Second World War this perspective changed: the modern constitution owes its authority not only to collective authorship, it also must commit itself credibly to human rights. Thus people recede into the background, and the national constitution becomes embedded into one or other system of 'peer review' among nations. This is what Alexander Somek argues is the creation of the cosmopolitan constitution. Reconstructing what he considers to be the three stages in the development of constitutionalism, he argues that the cosmopolitan constitution is not a blueprint for the constitution beyond the nation state, let alone a constitution of the international community; rather, it stands for constitutional law reaching out beyond its national bounds. This cosmopolitan constitution has two faces: the first, political, face reflects the changed circumstances of constitutional authority. It conceives itself as constrained by international human rights protection, firmly committed to combating discrimination on the grounds of nationality, and to embracing strategies for managing its interaction with other sites of authority, such as the United Nations. The second, administrative, face of the cosmopolitan constitution reveals the demise of political authority, which has been traditionally vested in representative bodies. Political processes yield to various, and often informal, strategies of policy co-ordination so long as there are no reasons to fear that the elementary civil rights might be severely interfered with. It represents constitutional authority for an administered world.
Epistemic cognition, the philosophical core of metacognition, concerns people’s knowledge about the justification and truth of beliefs. Multiple literatures in psychology and education address aspects of epistemic cognition. In the absence of a coherent conceptual framework, however, these literatures mostly fail to communicate with each other and often connect only loosely to genuine epistemology. This complicates any effort to achieve a systematic theoretical understanding of epistemic cognition and its development. Deanna Kuhn writes in her foreword, "Moshman is not the first to take on this challenge, but he fulfills it elegantly and, I think, the most comprehensively and astutely." After reviewing the basics of philosophical epistemology and cognitive psychology, Epistemic Cognition and Development provides a compelling account of developmental change across childhood and beyond in knowledge about knowledge, especially with regard to fundamental conceptions of objectivity, subjectivity, rationality, justification, and truth. This is followed by detailed consideration of domain-specific epistemologies of science, logic, morality, social convention, history, and identity, including associated forms of reasoning. The final section provides theoretical conclusions, educational and social applications, and suggestions for further research.
For Richard Posner, legal formalism and formalist judges--notably Antonin Scalia--present the main obstacles to coping with the dizzying pace of technological advance. Posner calls for legal realism--gathering facts, considering context, and reaching a sensible conclusion that inflicts little collateral damage on other areas of the law.