Jerome Bruner argues that the cognitive revolution, with its current fixation on mind as "information processor;" has led psychology away from the deeper objective of understanding mind as a creator of meanings. Only by breaking out of the limitations imposed by a computational model of mind can we grasp the special interaction through which mind both constitutes and is constituted by culture.
The Problem of Truth Bearers from Bolzano to Tarski
Author: Artur Rojszczak
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
IN MEMORIAM OF ARTUR ROJSZCZAK For a teacher, the opportunity to write the Foreword to a student’s work gives rise to a sense offul?lment and pride. In this case, however, although the latter remains, the former has been effaced.Inawell-ordered world Artur Rojszczak would have perhaps one day written tributes to ourselves. It isapoignant paradox when teachers are called upon to comment posthumously on thework of one of their students. This is a terrible task whichfalls to us—who have been not only mentors and colleagues to Artur, but also simply friends—of eulogizing someone who has died so soon, and so tragically. Artur was killed, together with his father, by an aggressive neighbour on September 27, 2001. Artur’s wife was severely injured in the same attack. Artur was born on March 12, 1968 in S?ubice (close to the Polish-German border). He studied in the Electronics College in Zielona Góra, graduating in 1987. But from very early on his dream was to study philosophy, and to do so at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow; no other place was considered by him seriously. He entered the university in 1988.
Critical Metaphysics and Contemporary Sacramental Theology
Author: Joseph C. Mudd
Publisher: Liturgical Press
This study moves beyond postmodern trends in Catholic eucharistic theology by exploring the works of Bernard Lonergan and Louis-Marie Chauvet: “Having learned from both Chauvet’s critique of metaphysics and Lonergan’s development of a critical metaphysics, we hope to offer a fruitful understanding of traditional eucharistic doctrines that is able to respond to some contemporary problems and shed some light on the great mystery that stands at the center of Christian worship” (from the introduction). Postmodern theologians have been critical of using metaphysics to interpret the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, liturgical sacrifice, and sacramental causality, preferring instead a symbolic approach. Lonergan’s critical metaphysics, however, offers an account of knowing and being that resists attempts to pit metaphysics against the symbolic and moves sacramental theology into the real world of meaning. The result is a theology of the Eucharist grounded in tradition that speaks to today’s believers.
What is it for a sentence to have a certain meaning? This is the question that William P. Alston, one of America's most distinguished and prolific analytic philosophers, addresses in this major contribution to the philosophy of language. His answer focuses on the given sentence's potential to play the role that its speaker had in mind—what he terms the usability of the sentence to perform the illocutionary act intended by its speaker. Alston defines an illocutionary act as an act of saying something with a certain "content." He develops his account of what it is to perform such acts in terms of taking responsibility, in uttering a sentence, for the existence of certain conditions. In requesting someone to open a window, for example, the speaker takes responsibility for its being the case that the window is closed and that the speaker has an interest in its being opened. In Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning, Alston expands upon this concept, creating a framework of five categories of illocutionary act and going on to argue that sentence meaning is fundamentally a matter of illocutionary act potential; that is, for a sentence to have a particular meaning is for it to be usable to perform illocutionary acts of a certain type. In providing detailed and explicit patterns of analysis for the whole range of illocutionary acts, Alston makes a unique contribution to the field of philosophy of language—one that is likely to generate debate for years to come.
This title offers a provocative re-reading of Wittgenstein's later writings on language and mind, and explores the tensions between Wittgenstein's ideas and contemporary cognitivist conceptions of the mental. Williams's theme throughout is the anti-individualism that she takes to underlie Wittgenstein's criticism of Cartesian thought. This book lays the foundation for a social conception of mind. This book addresses both Wittgenstein's later works as well as contemporary issues in philosophy of mind. It provides an insight into the later Wittgenstein and raises vital questions about the foundations of cognitivism and its wider implications for psychology and cognitive science.
In this work I have tried to present HusserI's Philosophy of thinking and meaning in as clear a manner as I can. In doing this, I had in mind a two-fold purpose. I wanted on the one hand to disentangle what I have come to regard as the central line of thought from the vast mass of details of the Logische Unter suchungen and the Formale und transzendentale Logik. On the other hand, I tried to take into consideration the immense developments in logic and semantics that have taken place since HusserI's major logical studies were published. It is my belief that no one to day can look back upon the philosophers of the past except in the light of the admirable progress achieved and consolidated in the fields of logic and semantics in recent times. Fortunately enough, from this point of view HusserI fares remarkably well. He certainly anticipated many of those recent investigations. What is more, a true understanding and appraisal of his logical studies is not possible except in the light of the corresponding modern investigations. This last consider ation may provide us with some explanation of the rather puzzling fact that orthodox HusserIian scholarship both within and outside Germany has not accorded to his logical studies the central importance that they, from all points of view, unmis takeably deserve.
This essay contains material which will hopefully be of interest not only to philosophers, but also to those social scientists whose research concerns the analysis of communication, verbal or non-verbal. Although most of the topics taken up here are central to issues in the philosophy of language, they are, in my opinion, indistinguishable from topics in descriptive social psychology. The essay aims to provide a conceptual framework within which various key aspects of communication can be described, and it presents a formal language, using techniques from modern modal logic, in which such descriptions can themselves be formulated. It is my hope that this framework, or parts of it, might also turn out to be of value in future empirical work. There are, therefore, essentially two sides to this essay: the development of a framework of concepts, and the construction of a formal language rich enough to express the elements of which that framework is composed. The first of these two takes its point of departure in the statement quoted from Lewis (1972) on the page preceding this introduction. The distinction drawn there by Lewis is accepted as a working hypothesis, and in one sense this essay may be seen as an attempt to explore some of the consequences of that hypothesis.
Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenology and the Logical Investigations is his most famous work. It had a decisive impact on twentieth century philosophy and is one of few works to have influenced both continental and analytic philosophy. This is the first time both volumes have been available in paperback. They include a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing the Investigations in historical context and bringing out their contemporary philosophical importance. These editions include a new preface by Sir Michael Dummett.