"This book discusses the causes of a major explosion at the Texas City Oil Refinery on March 23, 2005. The explosion killed 15 workers and injured more than 170 others. Failure to Learn also analyses the similarities between this event and the Longford Gas Plant explosion in Victoria in 1998."--Provided by publisher.
The Human and Organisational Causes of the Gulf of Mexico Blowout
Author: Andrew Hopkins
Publisher: Cch Australia Limited
Category: Business & Economics
Takes the reader into the realm of human and organisational factors that contributed to the Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010. This event resulted in the loss of 11 lives, the sinking of the rig and untold damage to the environment. It is important to know what people did, but even more important to know why they did it. Hopkins from ANU.
Learning from Failures provides techniques to explore the root causes of specific disasters and how we can learn from them. It focuses on a number of well-known case studies, including: the sinking of the Titanic; the BP Texas City incident; the Chernobyl disaster; the NASA Space Shuttle Columbia accident; the Bhopal disaster; and the Concorde accident. This title is an ideal teaching aid, informed by the author’s extensive teaching and practical experience and including a list of learning outcomes at the beginning of each chapter, detailed derivation, and many solved examples for modeling and decision analysis. This book discusses the value in applying different models as mental maps to analyze disasters. The analysis of these case studies helps to demonstrate how subjectivity that relies on opinions of experts can be turned into modeling approaches that can ensure repeatability and consistency of results. The book explains how the lessons learned by studying these individual cases can be applied to a wide range of industries. This work is an ideal resource for undergraduate and postgraduate students, and will also be useful for industry professionals who wish to avoid repeating mistakes that resulted in devastating consequences. Explores the root cause of disasters and various preventative measures Links theory with practice in regard to risk, safety, and reliability analyses Uses analytical techniques originating from reliability analysis of equipment failures, multiple criteria decision making, and artificial intelligence domains
Case Histories of Process Plant Disasters and How They Could Have Been Avoided
Author: Trevor Kletz
Category: Technology & Engineering
This is Trevor Kletz's follow up to his extremely successful What Went Wrong? Case Histories of Process Plant Disasters. In it, Kletz reinforces the messages in his now-classic book of famous case histories, but the majority of the book covers points not covered in the original. This new volume will focus more on procedural changes that can be made, not only at the technical or engineering levels, but at the managerial level, to prevent disasters from happening. * This volume follows up on the cases and strategies outlined in the original million-dollar seller: "What Went Wrong" * Contains many new cases and areas for improvement, including the hazards of rust, corrosion, and many more new topics * Written by the world's leading expert on industrial safety
Esso Longford Trial is vital reading for anyone who has read Lessons from Longford. Since the latter book's publication, many significant events have unfolded including both civil and criminal court action, as well as significant new legal requirements. Written by leading author, Professor Andrew Hopkins, this book is a must read for anyone following the Longford disaster.
It was Big Oil's nightmare moment, and the dominoes began falling years before the well was drilled. Two decades ago, British Petroleum, a venerable and storied corporation, was running out of oil reserves. Along came a new CEO of vision and vast ambition, John Browne, who pulled off one of the greatest corporate turnarounds in history. BP bought one company after another and then relentlessly fired employees and cut costs. It skipped safety procedures, pumped toxic chemicals back into the ground, and let equipment languish, even while Browne claimed a new era of environmentally sustainable business as his own. For a while the strategy worked, making BP one of the most profitable corporations in the world. Then it all began to unravel, in felony convictions for environmental crimes and in one deadly accident after another. Employees and regulators warned that BP’s problems, unfixed, were spinning out of control, that another disaster—bigger and deadlier—was inevitable. Nobody was listening. Having reported on business and the energy industry for nearly a decade, Abrahm Lustgarten uses interviews with key executives, former government investigators, and whistle-blowers along with his exclusive access to BP’s internal documents and emails to weave a spellbinding investigative narrative of hubris and greed well before the gulf oil spill.
Explains in detail how to perform the most commonly used hazard analysis techniques with numerous examples of practical applications • Includes new chapters on Concepts of Hazard Recognition, Environmental Hazard Analysis, Process Hazard Analysis, Test Hazard Analysis, and Job Hazard Analysis • Updated text covers introduction, theory, and detailed description of many different hazard analysis techniques and explains in detail how to perform them as well as when and why to use each technique • Describes the components of a hazard and how to recognize them during an analysis • Contains detailed examples that apply the methodology to everyday problems
Incidents That Define Process Safety describes approximately fifty incidents that have had a significant impact on the chemical and refining industries' approaches to modern process safety. Events are described in detail so readers get a fundamental understanding of the root causes, the consequences, the lessons learned, and actions that can prevent a recurrence. There are exhaustive investigative reports about these events, allowing you to apply the resulting safety principles to their current operations.
The truth behind the greatest environmental disaster in U.S. history In 2005, fifteen workers were killed when BP's Texas City Refinery exploded. In 2006, corroded pipes owned by BP led to an oil spill in Alaska. Now, in 2010, eleven men drilling for BP were killed in the blowout of the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico. What's next? In In Too Deep: BP and the Drilling Race That Took it Down, Stanley Reed?a journalist who has covered BP for over a decade?and investigative reporter Alison Fitzgerald answer not only that question, but also examine why these disasters happen to BP so much more than other large oil companies. Places the blame on a corporate culture created by former BP CEO John Browne who was forced to resign in 2007 after he lied in court documents in a case involving his gay lover Details a BP built on risk-taking and cost-cutting Examines the past, present, and future of BP In August 2010, BP successfully "killed" the company's damaged deepwater well. But, the environmental fallout and public relations campaign to rebuild the brand are just beginning. In Too Deep details why BP, why now, and what's next for this oil giant.
Financial incentives have long been used to try to influence professional values and practices. Recent events including the global financial crisis and the BP Texas City refinery disaster have been linked to such incentives, with commentators calling for a critical look at these systems given the catastrophic outcomes. Risky Rewards engages with this debate, particularly in the context of the present and potential role of incentives to manage major accident risk in hazardous industries. It examines the extent to which people respond to financial incentives, the potential for perverse consequences, and approaches that most appropriately focus attention on major hazard risk. The book is based in part on an empirical study of bonus arrangements in eleven companies operating in hazardous industries, including oil, gas, chemical and mining.
The story of the worst environmental disaster in American history and its enduring consequences BP Blowout is the first comprehensive account of the legal, economic, and environmental consequences of the disaster that resulted from the April 2010 blowout at a BP well in the Gulf of Mexico. The accident, which destroyed the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, killed 11 people. The ensuing oil discharge–the largest ever in U.S. waters—polluted much of the Gulf for months, wreaking havoc on its inhabitants and the environment. A management professor and former award-winning Justice Department lawyer responsible for enforcing environmental laws, Daniel Jacobs tells the story that neither BP nor the federal government wants heard: how the company and the government fell short, both in terms of preventing and responding to the disaster. Critical details about the cause and aftermath of the disaster have emerged through court proceedings and with time. The key finding of the federal judge who presided over the civil litigation was that the blowout resulted from BP’s gross negligence. BP has paid tens of billions of dollars to settle claims and lawsuits. The company also has pled guilty to manslaughter in a separate criminal case, but no one responsible for the tragedy is going to prison. BP Blowout provides new and disturbing details in a definitive narrative that takes the reader inside BP, the White House, Congress and the courthouse. This is an important book for readers interested in the environment, sustainability, public policy, leadership, and risk management.
In April 2010, the world watched in alarm as BP's Macondo well suffered a fatal explosion and a catastrophic leak. Over the next three months, amid tense scenes of corporate and political finger-pointing, millions of barrels of crude oil dispersed across the Gulf of Mexico in what became one of the worst oil spills in history. But there is more to BP's story than this. Tom Bergin, an oil broker turned Reuters reporter, watched the 'two-pipeline company' of the early 1980s grow into a dynamic oil giant and PR machine by the turn of the twenty-first century. His unique access to key figures before, during and after the spill - including former CEO Tony Hayward - has enabled him to piece together this compelling account of a corporation in crisis, and to examine how crucial decisions made during BP's remarkable turnaround paved the way for its darkest hour.
For Resilience Engineering, 'failure' is the result of the adaptations necessary to cope with the complexity of the real world, rather than a breakdown or malfunction. The performance of individuals and organizations must continually adjust to current conditions and, because resources and time are finite, such adjustments are always approximate. This definitive new book explores this groundbreaking new development in safety and risk management, where 'success' is based on the ability of organizations, groups and individuals to anticipate the changing shape of risk before failures and harm occur. Featuring contributions from many of the worlds leading figures in the fields of human factors and safety, Resilience Engineering provides thought-provoking insights into system safety as an aggregate of its various components, subsystems, software, organizations, human behaviours, and the way in which they interact. The book provides an introduction to Resilience Engineering of systems, covering both the theoretical and practical aspects. It is written for those responsible for system safety on managerial or operational levels alike, including safety managers and engineers (line and maintenance), security experts, risk and safety consultants, human factors professionals and accident investigators.
Fantasy Planning, Black Swans and Integrity Management
Author: Jan Hayes,Andrew Hopkins
Publisher: Cch Australia Limited
Category: Technology & Engineering
The worst nightmares of the oil and gas pipeline industry are coming true in the United States.High-pressure natural gas pipelines run underground through many suburban areas as part of the network providing fuel to homes and businesses. This infrastructure poses an immense, but insufficiently recognised, threat to the general public. In 2010, one of these pipelines ruptured in San Bruno, a suburb of San Francisco adjacent to the international airport. The result was a massive explosion and fire in which eight people died, many were injured, and 38 homes were destroyed. This possibility haunts many cities around the world.Coincidentally in the same year, another worst-case scenario came true, near Marshall, in the state of Michigan. A pipeline rupture released vast quantities of oily sludge into a local river system. The smell was so offensive that many nearby residents were forced to sell their homes and get out. The clean-up cost the pipeline owner more than a billion dollars, making it the most expensive oil spill on land in US history.This book examines the causes of these two events. It argues that, although they were profoundly surprising to the companies concerned, from a broader perspective they were no surprise at all, stemming as they did from well-known human, organisational and regulatory failures. In particular, we emphasise two contrasting but equally flawed approaches to prevention of rare but catastrophic events.Fantasy planningCompanies often try to convince themselves, regulators and members of the public that they have the relevant hazards under control because they have elaborate plans to deal with them. When it comes to the point, these plans turn out to be wildly optimistic and full of unjustified assumptions and inaccurate data. Their function is symbolic rather than instrumental - that is, they serve as statements that the hazard is under control, rather than as real instruments of control. Fantasy planning was very evident in both accidents.Black swansThe second approach adopts the currently fashionable "black swan" metaphor. In Europe, historically, all swans are white, and Europeans could not conceive of a black swan - until they discovered Australia. In the 21st century, the concept of a black swan has taken on new meaning - a rare event with major impact, quite unpredictable at the time, although possibly explicable in hindsight. Nowadays, major industrial accidents, such as the blowout in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, are sometimes referred to as black swans. But here the analogy breaks down. Black swans were unforeseeable to Europeans. Major accidents are not unforeseeable to risk analysts. In fact, it is their responsibility to foresee them and to put in place barriers against them. Accidents occur when those barriers fail. The metaphor is therefore wrong. In fact, it seems to be nothing more than a contemporary version of the idea that major accidents are inevitable - the 'stuff happens' view of risk management.Integrity managementThese two concepts shed new light on why integrity management is so difficult to get right and also how it can be improved. We hope that those in positions of responsibility in companies that have responsibility for hazardous facilities will feel the need to scrutinise their own integrity management systems with these absurdities in mind. The major failings we have identified provide valuable lessons for all organisations that use risk assessments to manage and prioritise routine activities.Oxford University Press Australia & New Zealand is the non-exclusive distributor of this title.
"A phenomenal feat of journalism. . . . I tore through it like a novel but with the queasy knowledge that the whole damn thing is true." —Sebastian Junger, author of The Perfect Storm and War Blending exclusive first-person interviews and penetrating investigative reporting, oil rig captain John Konrad and veteran Washington Post writer Tom Shroder give the definitive, white-knuckled account of the Deepwater Horizon explosion—as well as a riveting insider’s view of the byzantine culture of offshore drilling that made the disaster inevitable. As the world continues to cope with the oil spill’s grim aftermath—with environmental and economic consequences all the more dire in a region still rebuilding from Hurricane Katrina—Konrad and Schroder’s real-time account of the disaster shows us just where things went wrong, and points the way to a safer future for us all.