Leon J. Goldstein critically examines the philosophical role of concepts and concept formation in the social sciences. The book undertakes a study of concept formation and change by looking at four critical terms in anthropology (kinship), politics (parliament and the general will), and sociology (individualism).
A.W. Coats has made unique contributions to the history of economic thought, economic methodology and the sociology of economics. This volume collects together, for the first time, a substantial part of his work on the sociology and professionalization of economics.
Author: Vincent F. Hendricks,Klaus F. Jørgensen,Jesper Lützen,Stig A. Pedersen
The main theme of this anthology is the unique interaction between mathematics, physics and philosophy during the beginning of the 20th century. In this book, ten renowned philosopher-historians probe insightfully into key conceptual questions of pre-quantum mathematical physics. The result is a diverse yet thematically focused compilation of first class papers on mathematics, physics and philosophy, and a source-book on the interaction between them.
Although Sir Karl Popper's contributions to a number of diverse areas of philosophy are widely appreciated, serious criticism of his work has tended to focus on his philosophy of the natural sciences. This volume contains twelve critical essays on Popper's contribution to what we have called the 'human sciences' , a category broad enough to include not only Popper's views on the methods of the social sciences but also his views on the relation of mind and body, Freud's psychology, and the status of cultural objects. Most of our contributors are philosophers whose own work stands outside the Popperian framework. We hope that this has resulted in a volume whose essays confront not merely the details of Popper's argu ments but also the very presuppositions of his thinking. With one exception, the essays appear here for the first time. The exception is L.J. Cohen's paper, which is a revised and considerably expanded ver sion of a paper first published in the British Journalfor the Philosophy of Science for June 1980. We would like to thank Loraine Hawkins and Jane Hogg for their editorial assistance and June O'Donnell for typing various manuscripts and all the correspondence which a volume of essays entails.
Dynamic Assessment, Intelligence and Measurement paves the way for the development of dynamic assessment by applying this unique approach to the assessment of human potential. Explores the relationship that dynamic assessment shares with intelligence and measurement Outlines a new approach to the assessment of human intelligence while remaining rooted within the scientific realm of psychology Fuses philosophy, science methodology, and meta-theory to offer an innovative framework for the assessment of models and theories, dynamic assessment, intelligence, measurement theory, and statistical significance testing Provides the theoretical underpinnings that can lead to a new way forward for the 'movement' of dynamic assessment
This is a bold, brilliant, provocative and puzzling work. It demands a radical shift in standpoint, an almost paradoxical posture in which living systems are described in terms of what lies outside the domain of descriptions. Professor Humberto Maturana, with his colleague Francisco Varela, have undertaken the construction of a systematic theoretical biology which attempts to define living systems not as they are objects of observation and description, nor even as in teracting systems, but as self-contained unities whose only reference is to them selves. Thus, the standpoint of description of such unities from the 'outside', i. e. , by an observer, already seems to violate the fundamental requirement which Maturana and Varela posit for the characterization of such system- namely, that they are autonomous, self-referring and self-constructing closed systems - in short, autopoietic systems in their terms. Yet, on the basis of such a conceptual method, and such a theory of living systems, Maturana goes on to define cognition as a biological phenomenon; as, in effect, the very nature of all living systems. And on this basis, to generate the very domains of interac tion among such systems which constitute language, description and thinking.
This book contains selected papers from symposia and contributed sessions presented at the third biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, held in Lansing, Michigan, on October 27-29, 1972. We are grateful to Michigan State University, and especially to Professor Peter Asquith and his students and colleagues, for their friendly and efficient hospitality in organizing the circumstances of the sessions and of the 'intersessions', the unscheduled free time which is so important to any scholarly gathering. Several of the symposium papers have unhappily not been made available: those of Alasdair MacIntyre and Sidney Morgenbesser in the session on the social sciences, that of Ian Hacking in the session on randomness and that of Imre Lakatos in the session on discovery and rationality in science. Department of History and KENNETH F. SCHAFFNER Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh Center for the Philosophy and ROBERT S. COHEN History of Science, Boston University TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE v PART I/SYMPOSIUM: SPACE, TIME AND MATTER: THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRODYNAMICS ADOLF GRUNBAUM / Space, Time, and Matter: The Foundations of Geometrodynamics. Introductory Remarks 3 CHARLES W. MISNER / Some Topics for Philosophical Inquiry Concerning the Theories of Mathematical Geometrodynamics and of Physical Geometrodynamics 7 JOHN STACHEL / The Rise and Fall of Geometrodynamics 31 PART II / PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF BIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY STUART KAUFFMAN / Elsasser, Generalized Complementarity, and Finite Classes: A Critique of His Anti-Reductionism 57 WILLIAM C.
The goal of the present volume is to discuss the notion of a 'conceptual framework' or 'conceptual scheme', which has been dominating much work in the analysis and justification of knowledge in recent years. More specifi cally, this volume is designed to clarify the contrast between two competing approaches in the area of problems indicated by this notion: On the one hand, we have the conviction, underlying much present-day work in the philosophy of science, that the best we can hope for in the justifi cation of empirical knowledge is to reconstruct the conceptual means actually employed by science, and to develop suitable models for analyzing conceptual change involved in the progress of science. This view involves the assumption that we should stop taking foundational questions of epistemology seriously and discard once and for all the quest for uncontrovertible truth. The result ing program of justifying epistemic claims by subsequently describing patterns of inferentially connected concepts as they are at work in actual science is closely connected with the idea of naturalizing epistemology, with concep tual relativism, and with a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge. On the other hand, recent epistemology tends to claim that no subsequent reconstruction of actually employed conceptual frameworks is sufficient for providing epistemic justification for our beliefs about the world. This second claim tries to resist the naturalistic and pragmatic approach to epistemology and insists on taking the epistemological sceptic seriously.
Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science
Author: Sandra Harding,Merrill B. Hintikka †
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
This collection of essays, first published two decades ago, presents central feminist critiques and analyses of natural and social sciences and their philosophies. This work provides a splendid opportunity for upper-level undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy and the social sciences to explore some of the most intriguing and controversial challenges to disciplinary projects and to public policy today.
A Contribution Concerning the Methodological Problems of Scientific Concepts and Scientific Explanation
Author: L. Tondl
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
For a decade, we have admired the incisive and broadly informed works of Ladislav Tondl on the foundations of science. Now it is indeed a pleasure to include this book among the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. We hope that it will help to deepen the collaborative scholar ship of scientists and philosophers in Czechoslovakia with the English reading scholars of the world. Professor Ladislav Tondl was born in 1924, and completed his higher education at the Charles University iIi Prague. His doctorate was granted by the Institute of Information Theory and Automation. He was a professor and scientific research worker at the Institute for the Theory and Methodology of Science, which was a component part of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Tondl's principal fields of interest are the methodology of the empirical and experimental sciences, logical semantics, and cybernetics. For many years, he collaborated with Professor Albert Perez and others at the Institute of Information Theory and Automation in Prague, and he has undertaken fruitful collaboration with logicians in the Soviet and Polish schools, and been influenced by the Finnish logicians as well, among them Jaakko Hintikka. We list below a selection of his main publications. Perhaps the most accessible in presenting his central conception of the relationship between modem information theory and the methodology of the sciences is his 1965 paper with Perez, 'On the Role of Information Theory in Certain Scientific Procedures'.
On Popper vs. Polanyi The Polish Conferences 1988–89
Author: J. Misiek
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Rationality of science was the topic of two conferences (held in 1988 and 1989) organized by the Department of Philosophy of Science, Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University. Both conferences included a small group of invited speakers. This book contains a selection of papers presented there. It is intended mainly for specialists in the philosophy of science and scientists interested in philosophy. Students and especially postgraduate students would also benefit from reading it. The first conference, 'Popper, Polanyi and the Notion of Rationality', was held from 1 to 5 October 1988 in Janowice. The second conference, 'The Aim and Rationality of Science', was held in Cracow at the Jagiellonian Univer sity, from 4-10 June 1989. The topics of both conferences were inspired by our late friend Dr. Tomasz Kocowski, who many years earlier invited me and my colleagues from the Department to participate in research concerning the problem of creativity, and serve him and other psychologists as methodological advisors. Personal contacts with this intelligent and inquisitive man helped us to realize that we could not fulfill our task while adhering to the received view in the philoso phy of science. This experience helped us to see science not only as scientific knowledge but also as a process of research. We then turned our attention to Michael Polanyi, who seemed to provide the philosophy we were looking for.
Author: Mirko Drazen Grmek,Robert S. Cohen,Guido Cimino
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
The 1977 lectures of the International School for the History of Science at Erice in Sicily were devoted to that vexing but inexorable problem, the nature of scientific discovery. With all that has been written, by scientists themselves, by historians and philosophers and social theorists, by psycholo gists and psychiatrists, by logicians and novelists, the problem remains elusive. Happily we are able to bring the penetrating lectures from Erice that summer to a wider audience in this volume of theoretical investigations and detailed case studies. The ancient and lovely town of Erice in Northwest Sicily, 750 m above the sea, was famous throughout the Mediterranean for its temple of the goddess of nature, Venus Erycina, said to have been built by Daedalus. As philosophers and historians of the natural sciences, we hope that the stimulating atmo sphere of Erice will to some extent be transmitted by these pages. We are especially grateful to that generous and humane physician and historian of science, Dr. Vincenzo Cappelletti, himself a creative scientist, for his collaboration in bringing this work to completion. We admire his intelligent devotion to fostering creative interaction between scientists and historians of science as Director of the School of History of Science within the great Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture at Erice, as well as for his imaginative leadership of the Istituto della Encic10pedia Italiana.
For much of the last three decades or more economic methodology has been dominated by the work of Karl Popper who advocated the position that science is what it is by virtue of its adherence to certain ideals. The methodology of science is therefore not empirical or descriptive, but rather a set of rules for producing `rational' or `objective' knowledge. This volume presents alternatives to an exclusively Popperian methodology: its purpose is not to reject Popper, but to show there are other ways of construing methodology. The book is divided into three parts. Part I contains two critical surveys -- one dealing with the rule-based tradition which has had a great influence on economic methodology in the last three decades and the other arguing for the social conditioning of knowledge. Part II is concerned with auxiliary hypotheses needed to link rational choice at the social and individual levels. Part III follows up on aspects raised in linking rational choice at the social and individual levels by looking at specific issues, including rhetoric and economics and gender and economic research.